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A NOVEL APPROACH TO WARRANTLESS SEIZURES
OF THE HOME: INSPIRATIONAL OR
ABERRATIONAL LAW?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits both
unreasonable searches and seizures of homes.' By interposing ajudicial magistrate

between the public and law enforcement officials to make the probable cause
determination, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the primary
means for ensuring the reasonableness of searches and seizures.' The United
States Supreme Court has held that a warrantless search of a home is per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 3 unless police obtain the consent'
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
2. See United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981) (basic test of
reasonableness of searches and seizures is warrant requirement). The warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment provides for the issuance of warrants only upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation. See U.S. CoNsT. amend IV; see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 213 (1979) (Fourth Amendment probable cause standard reflects reasonableness requirement).
The Supreme Court has held that a neutral and detached magistrate should make the probable
cause determination in order to effectuate Fourth Amendment protections. See, e.g., Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978) (task of magistrate to determine independently whether probable cause exists); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960) (decision of independent
judicial officer whether probable cause is present to justify invasion of liberty); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958) (magistrate must judge for himself whether facts support
probable cause determination); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (neutral magistrate
rather than officer engaged in crime prevention should make probable cause determination).
3. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (police may not cross threshold
of home without warrant); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (subjective belief
of officer that evidence contained inside dwelling does not justify warrantless search); see also
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (police ordinarily may not search dwelling without
warrant despite existence of probable cause).
4. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921). In Amos, deputy collectors of
the Internal Revenue Service went to the defendant's home to search the premises for violations
of revenue law. Id. at 315. Although the revenue agents did not have a warrant, the defendant's
wife submitted to the tax agents' authority and reluctantly permitted the tax collectors to search
the premises. Id. The search uncovered illicitly distilled whiskey which the trial court admitted
into evidence. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that the search was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment because the tax collectors did not possess a search warrant.
Id. at 315-16. The Court stated that the implied coercion by the collectors precluded the Court
from considering whether the defendant's wife intentionally waived her husband's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 316. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have cited Amos to stand for the proposition that a valid consent to search constitutes a permissible waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (prosecution must show
that defendant freely and voluntarily gave consent prior to warrantless search before admission
of challenged evidence); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 712-13 (1948) (Vinson, C. J.,
dissenting) (federal agents properly on premises where owner gave consent to entry), overruled,
339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (entry into defendant's
hotel room illegal when defendant granted entry in submission of authority and not by intentional waiver of constitutional right); cf. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 592-93 (1946)
(right to inspect public documents at place of business distinguished from warrantless search of
residence conducted without voluntary consent). See generally Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches
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of the owner of the home5 or unless exigent circumstances justify an immediate7
search. 6 To guarantee that police do hot profit from unreasonable conduct,
and the FourthAmendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REv.
217, 217-22 (1973) (discussion of Supreme Court decisions involving consent searches).
5. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (hotel clerk not permitted to give
consent to search room of hotel guest); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961)
(landlord-owner of home not permitted to give consent to search part of house which tenant
exclusively occupied). But see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (consent to
justify warrantless search permissible if obtained from third party who exercised common authority
over premises). See generally Wefing & Miles, supra note 4, at 253-83 (discussion of third party
consent); Note, Consent Searches: A ReappraisalAfter Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoL. L. Rv.
130, 149-50 (1967) (discussion of consent by co-occupants of dwelling).
6. See United States v. Santana, 423 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (pursuit of suspect by police
into private dwelling justified by exigency of situation); Warden v. Hayden, 382 U.S. 294, 298-300
(1967) (exigent circumstances permitted police to enter home which armed felon had entered).
Although the Supreme Court has not stated explicitly that the possible destruction or removal
of evidence justifies a warrantless search of a home, the Court has intimitated that the potential
destruction of evidence may constitute an exigent circumstance justifying an exception to the
warrant requirement. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (warrantless search
of hotel room held unlawful because government did not demonstrate possible destruction or
removal of contraband contained within hotel room). Similarly, the Supreme Court has upheld
a warrantless search of a suspect's body when the evidence contained therein would remain in
the body only a short period of time. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (Court
found warrantless removal of fingernail scrapings from suspect reasonable under Fourth Amendment because evidence was of disappearing nature); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71
(1966) (Court upheld blood extraction because evidence of blood-alcohol content threatened with
destruction).
The strongest support, however, for the Supreme Court's approval of a destruction of evidence
exception to the warrant requirement stems from the Court's language in United States v. Santana. 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In Santana, police went to the home of the defendant in search of
money used to purchase contraband. Id. at 40. Upon arrival, police found the defendant in the
doorway of the defendant's home. Id. After identifying themselves as policemen, the officers
approached the defendant who retreated into the vestibule of her home. Id. The officers apprehended the defendant in the vestibule and found contraband on the floor of the vestibule
which the defendant had dropped during the struggle. Id. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania suppressed the evidence found by the agents, reasoning that the defendant's flight from the doorway into the house did not justify a warrantless entry on the grounds
of "hot pursuit." Id. at 41. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (warrantless entry
into home after suspect had entered was reasonable due to exigency of situation). The Supreme
Court, however, held that once the suspect retreated into her home, a realistic likelihood existed
that any delay would result in the destruction of evidence. Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. Accordingly,
the Court upheld the warrantless entry to make an arrest because of the exigencies of the situation. Id. The Court further noted that the contraband discovered on the floor of the defendant's
home was admissible at trial because once police lawfully had arrested the defendant, a search
incident to arrest was justifiable. Id.; see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970) (warrantless
search held unlawful since goods ultimately seized were not in process of destruction); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (warrantless search and seizure found unlawful because
imminent destruction or removal of evidence not present). See generally Comment, Warrantless
Residential Searches to Prevent the Destruction of Evidence: A Need for Strict Standards, 70
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 255, 269 (1979) (warrantless entries into residences to prevent destruction
of evidence permitted under expanding exigent circumstances exception to warrant requirement).
7. See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975) (purpose of exclusionary rule
is to deter unlawful police conduct); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (exclusionary rule designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through deterrent effects); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (rule excluding evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment
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the Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.I Nonetheless, circuit courts have refused to apply

the exclusionary rule to evidence that police obtained from a source independent

of a prior illegal search. 9 The independent source doctrine permits the admission
is principal mode of discouraging unlawful police conduct); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44
(1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence is only means for ensuring that police do not gain from unlawful conduct), overruled, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See
generally Gilday, The Exclusionary Rule Down and Almost Out, 4 N. Ky. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977)
(rationale of exclusion assumed that potential exclusion of items seized would discourage police
from utilizing unconstitutional means to obtain evidence). Although the Supreme Court consistently has maintained that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, several commentators have questioned whether the exclusionary rule effectively deters unlawful
police conduct. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
Cm. L. REv. 665, 674-709 (1970) (analysis of empirical evidence indicates exclusionary rule does
not have direct effect on police conduct); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents
Proved That It Is A Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404, 405-409 (1979) (empirical studies
reveal that exclusionary rule is ineffective deterrent); Comment, Comparative Analysis of the
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 57 TuL L. RE. 648, 654-57 (1983) (deterrence rationale
fails to support exclusionary rule because police officers often arrest not for conviction but for
harassment purposes). One commentator has suggested that alternative measures through judicial
processes such as civil damage actions, criminal penalties and injunctions would more effectively
deter police misconduct than does the exclusionary rule. See Schroeder, DeterringFourthAmendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEo. L.J. 1361, 1386-1426 (1981)
(discussion of alternatives to exclusionary rule). Moreover, another commentator has noted that
the trend of the Supreme Court is to limit application of the exclusionary rule. See Comment,
The Exclusionary Rule" Its Necessity in ConstitutionalDemocracy, 23 How. L.J. 299, 300-01
n.7 (1980) (listing of recent Supreme Court decisions which have restricted scope of exclusionary
rule). Although the exclusionary rule has come under recent scrutiny, recent statistics and surveys
show that the exclusionary rule does have a deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct. See
Note, The Exclusionary Rule: Alive and Well After a Decade of Surgery, 17 GoNz. L. REv.
735, 748-52 (1982) (exclusionary rule effectively protects citizens from unlawful invasion of home
and privacy).
8. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The Supreme Court first adopted
a federal rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment in Weeks v. United
States. See id. (unlawfully seized letters and information obtained therefrom excluded under protections of Fourth Amendment). In Weeks, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence vindicated a victim's right of privacy. Id. at 393-94. The Supreme Court in Mapp
v. Ohio extended the exclusionary rule to the states. See 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (lascivious
books and pictures seized from defendant's home without warrant suppressed under rule of exclusion formerly applicable only to federal government). In Mapp, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule was an essential element of the Fourth Amendment and that the rights contained
within the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 651; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (state can not deny person
within jurisdiction equal protection under law). The Supreme Court, however, never intended
the exclusionary rule to prohibit all usages of illegally seized evidence. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976) (state prisoner denied federal habeas corpus relief despite use of illegally
seized evidence at trial); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-52 (1974) (illegally seized
evidence admissible before grand jury); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1954) (illegally seized evidence admissible at trial to impeach credibility of witness).
9. See, e.g., Grimaldi v. United States, 606 F.2d 332, 336 (Ist Cir. 1979) (suppression
not required where affidavit supporting warrant included some illegally obtained evidence because
agents gained other evidence from independent source); United States v. Pike, 523 F.2d 734,
736 (5th Cir. 1975) (suppression not required where illegally seized evidence merely intensified
investigation which led police to discover additional evidence); Howell v. Cupp, 427 F.2d 36,
38 (9th Cir. 1970) (affidavit which contained unlawfully obtained information not invalidated
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of evidence seized pursuant to a valid warrant following a prior illegal search
provided that a causal relationship did not exist between the initial unlawful search
and the evidence subsequently seized.'" Courts, however, have experienced difficulties in consistently applying the independent source doctrine to evidence that
police lawfully obtained after a prior warrantless seizure of a home.II Because

because other information in affidavit established probable cause); United States v. Sterling, 369
F.2d 799, 802 (3rd Cir. 1966) (evidence obtained from subsequent search did not require suppression merely because improper material contained in affidavit supporting warrant); see also 3 W.
LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4, at 617-20 (illustration of independent source test); infra note
10 (discussion of origin of independent source doctrine).
10. See Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The independent source doctrine originated in the Supreme Court's decision in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States. See id. In Silverthorne, a United States marshall searched and seized the books
and records of the defendant Silverthorne Lumber Company without a warrant. Id. at 390. The
defendant filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York seeking the return of the books and records. Id. at 390-91. The marshall returned the books
and records but kept copies of the seized documents. Id. at 391. Based on information gained
from the papers, the government formed an indictment against the Silverthorne's. Id. The district
court then ordered the defendants to return the originals. Id. The defendants refused to comply
with the district court's order and the court held the Silverthornes in contempt. Id. On writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's contempt conviction. Id. at 392. The Silverthorne Court held that the government may not profit from a prior unlawful search and seizure
of the defendants' papers and, therefore, refused to admit evidence obtained from knowledge
gained from the prior illegal search and seizure. Id. The Court, however, commented that if
the government obtained knowledge of the information contained in the illegally seized documents
through a source independent of the prior unlawful seizure, the government could introduce the
information into evidence at trial. Id.
The notion that the government may not profit from its illegal conduct led to the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (trial
judge must allow defendant to demonstrate that government's case was fruit of poisonous tree
once defendant establishes prior illegal conduct). The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine provides that evidence obtained by virture of unlawful conduct becomes the "poisoned tree" and
if this evidence leads to additional evidence, the secondary evidence becomes the "fruit of the
poisoned tree" which is inadmissible in court. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
485-87 (1963) (statements made by suspect following unlawful arrest excluded as fruits of illegal
arrest). In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court indicated that evidence unlawfully obtained does not
become "fruit of the poisoned tree" merely because the police would not have uncovered the
evidence but for the police's prior illegal conduct. Id. at 487-88. The Wong Sun Court stated
that evidence is not "fruit of the poisonous tree" and is admissible under the independent source
doctrine if the evidence has come about by means distinguishable from the initial illegality and
not by exploitation of the prior illegal conduct. Id. See generally Pitler, "'The Fruitof the Poisoned
Tree" Revisted and Shepardized, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 579, 593-94 (1968) (discussion of Wong Sun
"fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine).
11. Compare United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (independent
source doctrine does not operate to admit evidence obtained pursuant to unlawful seizure of
home because application of doctrine would encourage warrantless seizures while police sought
independent evidentiary basis to justify warrant) and People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 850, 533
P.2d 211, 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 94 (1975) (officers could not retroactively validate prior unlawful
seizure of premises because seizure of premises constituted seizure of property contained inside
home) with People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27, 34, 444 N.E.2d 13, 17, 457 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (1982)
(exclusionary rule should not suppress evidence which is product of independent source despite
prior unlawful seizure of home).
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the Supreme Court has not addressed the questionII courts have differed about
whether the warrantless securing of a home constitutes an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.' 3 Consequently, courts have disagreed about
whether a warrantless securing of a home mandates application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence subsequently obtained pursuant to a lawful
search.I4
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal court to address the admissibility
of evidence seized during a valid search following a prior warrantless seizure
12. See United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 549 (6th Cir.) (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(Supreme Court has not recognized securing premises-in-anticipation-of-warrant exception to warrant
requirement), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); State v. Ramos, 405 So.2d 1001, 1002 n.4 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Supreme Court never has recognized exception to warrant requirement
permitting police to secure premises in anticipation of warrant). But see United States v. Segura,
663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (February 22, 1983). In Segura, police
illegally entered and secured the dwelling of the defendant while awaiting the arrival of a search
warrant. Id. at 413. The Second Circuit held that although the warrantless entry was illegal,
evidence found after the issuance of a valid search warrant was admissible because the police
did not seize the evidence not discovered during the unlawful entry until the lawful search pursuant to a valid warrant. Id. at 416-17. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether the
police's entry and occupancy of the defendant's residence violated the constitutional requirement
that a magistrate find probable cause before police may violate the privacy of a home. See 51
U.S.L.W. 3611, 3611 (Feb. 22, 1983). Since seizures ordinarily do not violate the privacy of a
home, the Supreme Court appeared to be focusing on the warrantless entry into the defendant's
dwelling rather than the warrantless seizure. Cf. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S.
338, 357-58 (1977) (Court held that seizure of automobiles did not involve invasion of Fourth
Amendment privacy interests); Grano, Rethinking the FourthAmendment WarrantRequirement,
19 AM. Cium. L. REv. 603, 648 (1981) (seizures do not intrude on individual's privacy interests
but only interfere with possessory interest in item seized).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 1983) (warrantless seizure
of dwelling is unreasonable absent exigent circumstances); United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182,
1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (securing of dwelling without warrant constitutes illegal seizure); People
v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 850, 533 P.2d 211, 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 94 (1975) (warrantless
securing of dwelling analogous to police seizing individual items within home prior to acquisition
of search warrant); State v. Ramos, 405 So. 2d 1001, 1002-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (seizure
of home illegal under Fourth Amendment absent warrant or presence of exigent circumstances);
State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 473, 572 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1978) (securing of residence without
warrant or exigent circumstances constitutes illegal seizure of all items contained within residence);
see also State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 615 P.2d 740, 744 (1980) (warrantless seizure of
home amounted to unlawful seizure of home and contents); State v. Hansen, 295 Or. 78, -,
664 P.2d 1095, 1105-06 (1983) (warrantless seizure of home constitutes unlawful seizure of home
and objects which police intended to subsequently seize). But see People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d
27, 34-35, 444 N.E.2d 13, 17, 457 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (1982) (warrantless seizure of dwelling not
unreasonable seizure); Grano, supra note 12, at 647 (warrantless seizures based on probable cause
should be permissible under Fourth Amendment).
14. See United States v. Allard (AlardI1), 634 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (warrantless
seizure of home requires suppression of evidence subsequently obtained pursuant to lawful search
unless government can show that illegal seizure did not make difference); People v. Shuey, 13
Cal. 3d 835, 850, 533 P.2d 211, 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 94 (1975) (securing of dwelling without
warrant mandates application of exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained during subsequent lawful search). But see People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27, 35, 444 N.E.2d 13, 17, 457 N.Y.S.
2d 763, 767 (1982) (unlawful act of securing apartment should not result in exclusion of evidence
obtained independent of unlawful activity).
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of a home.' 5 In United States v. Allard (Allard I),16 government agents arrested

Wayne Allard for distribution of cocaine at the apartment of Allard's
accomplice. 7 The government agents then went to Allard's hotel room to search
for contraband.' 8 Although the government agents did not obtain a warrant

prior to proceeding to Allard's hotel room, an occupant of Allard's hotel room
reluctantly permitted the agents to enter.' 9 Once inside Allard's hotel room,

a government agent called the Assistant United States Attorney to request a
search warrant. 2" The government agents then remained in the hotel room
and detained the occupant until the warrant arrived. 2' During the ensuing search

pursuant to the search warrant, the agent discovered contraband which the
government utilized to bring an indictment against Allard.22 At trial, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington characterized
the agents' warrantless entry as an unlawful search and suppressed the evidence

seized pursuant to a valid warrant, reasoning that the exclusionary rule23
mandated the suppression of evidence obtained after a prior unlawful entry.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not address the agents' warrantless

securing of the defendant's hotel room. 24 Instead, the court stated that the
agents' warrantless entry and occupancy constituted an unlawful search under
the Fourth Amendment since neither consent nor exigent circumstances were
present to justify the agents' conduct. 25 To determine whether the exclusionary
15. See Allard 11, 634 F.2d at 1183 (seizure prior to issuance of warrant is unlawful under
Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 1983) (warrantless securing of dwelling constitutes unreasonable seizure absent exigent circumstances); infra
notes 32-37 and 53-57 and accompanying text (Allard IIand Lomas courts' rationale on warrantless securing of dwelling).
16. United States v. Allard (Allard 1), 600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979).
17. Id. at 1302. In Allard I, government agents arrested Douglas Richmond for possession
of cocaine. Id. Richmond identified his source as Wayne Allard who was to deliver additional
cocaine to Richmond at Richmond's apartment. Id. The government agents went to Richmond's
apartment and found Allard there. Id. The agents arrested Allard but a search incident to arrest
did not uncover contraband. Id. Consequently, the agents decided to go to Allard's hotel room
to continue the investigation. Id. at 1303.
18. Id.
19. Id. In Allard I, the agents asked the occupant if the agents could enter and speak with
the occupant. Id. The occupant responded: "I suppose I don't have any choice." Id. The agents
entered and questioned the occupant about participation in the cocaine operation. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id. In Allard I, the agents testified that they would not have permitted the removal
of the room's contents or allowed the occupant to leave. Id. The agents also testified that they
remained in the hotel room because the agents believed that they had probable cause which justified
their presence inside the room. Id. The agents further testified that they did not conduct a search
of the hotel room until a warrant arrived. Id.
22. Id.

23. See Id. at 1302.
24. See United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1980) (Ninth Circuit previously
had no occasion to consider effect of warrantless seizure of hotel room).
25. 600 F.2d at 1304. In deciding that the agents' warrantless entry and occupancy violated
the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit in Allard I found that the occupant of the room did
not voluntarily consent to the agents' warrantless entry. Id.; see supra note 19 and accompanying
text (facts underlying nonconsensual entry determination). The Allard I court also acknowledged
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rule required the suppression of the evidence seized, the Ninth Circuit remanded
the case to the district court for a determination of whether the prior unlawful
search provided the agents with information that motivated the agents to seek

a search warrant.26 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that if the agents' observations while unlawfully inside the hotel room were a substantial factor in the
agents' decision to request a search warrant, then the independent source doctrine would not permit the admission of the evidence subsequently seized

pursuant to the lawful search.27
On remand, the district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence seized pursuant to the lawful search.2" The district court determined
that the agents did not obtain information from the prior unlawful search

influencing the agents' subsequent decision to seek a search warrant.2 9 The
court then applied the independent source doctrine to admit the evidence subsequently seized pursuant to the lawful search." Allard appealed the district
3
court's decision to the Ninth Circuit. '
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Allard (Allard11)32 held
that the agents' warrantless occupation of the defendant's hotel room constituted an unreasonable seizure of the room and the room's contents under
the Fourth Amendment. 33 The Allard II court observed that the agents would

that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify a warrantless entry. 600 F.2d at 1304. As support for the court's position, the Allard I court noted that the government did not produce any
evidence demonstrating that the agents believed that the occupant of the room was about to
destroy evidence. Id.
26. 600 F.2d at 1306. The Ninth Circuit in Allard I stated that the court could not determine from the record whether the defendant had established that the challenged evidence had
resulted from exploitation of the agents' illegal entry into Allard's hotel room. Id. Since the
district court did not fully develop the facts underlying the agents' motivation for the issuance
of a search warrant, the Allard I court remanded the case to the district court to explicate the
underlying facts. Id.
27. Id. The Allard I court commented that if the agents' observations gained from the
unlawful entry merely intensified and already ongoing investigation, the unlawful entry would
not render the evidence subsequently obtained inadmissible because the agents would not have
recovered evidence through exploitation of the unlawful entry. Id. at 1305; see United States
v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 186 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (courts should suppress only evidence specifically derived from illegal conduct); United States
v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1977) (as amended January 18, 1978) (illegal search
intensifying investigation does not require suppression of evidence subsequently obtained in lawful
manner).
28. 634 F.2d at 1183.
29. Id. at 1184. The district court in Allard 11 stated that even if the agents' observations
were a motivating factor in the agents' subsequent decision to seek a warrant, the illegally obtained
observations were so insubstantial that their role in the subsequent discovery of the evidence
was minimal. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1183.
32. 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980) (Allard II).
33. Id. at 1184 (Allard IIcourt concluded that by any rational test agents' occupancy of
Allard's hotel room constituted seizure of room). In holding that the agents' occupancy constituted a seizure of the room and the room's contents, the Allard H court relied on the Ninth
Circuit's earlier decision in United States v. Bacall. Id. at 1185-86; see United States v. Bacall,
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not have permitted the occupant of the hotel room to leave and that the agents
would not have permitted the removal of the room's contents.3" The court
further observed that the agents continued to secure Allard's hotel room until
the search warrant arrived. 35 Since the Ninth Circuit previously had determined
that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless seizure, 36 the Allard
II court stated that the agents' seizure of the defendant's hotel room was
unreasonable because normal police procedures provided alternative measures
to guard against the potential destruction of the evidence."'
After establishing that the agents' conduct was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, the Allard II court next considered the admissibility of
evidence lawfully seized subsequent to the prior unlawful seizure of the defendant's hotel room. 3 The Ninth Circuit rejected application of the independent source doctrine to admit evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful seizure,
reasoning that application of the independent source doctrine to evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure would encourage police to seize places
without probable cause while police sought an independent evidentiary basis
to justify issuance of a search warrant. 39 Instead, the Allard II court advocated
a new test to determine the admissibility of evidence lawfully seized following

443 F.2d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972). In Bacall, customs agents
seized the defendant's warehouse which resulted in the seizure of the fabrics contained inside.
443 F.2d at 1053. The government, however, based its case on evidence obtained from a foreign
investigation resulting from an inventory of the items unlawfully seized and not on the fabrics
seized themselves. Id. at 1057. The Bacall court stated that the determination whether the contested evidence came about by exploitation of the illegal seizure rested on the role the illegal
seizure played in the subsequent discovery of the evidence. Id. Since the agents did not secure
the defendant's warehouse with the intent of seizing the fabrics inside, the Bacallcourt reasoned
that the evidence subsequently obtained did not result from exploitation of the illegal seizure.
Id. at 1057, 1061. The Bacall court, therefore, applied the independent source doctrine to admit
the evidence at trial. Id. at 1061 (court noted that admission of evidence would not encourage
unlawful seizures since normally evidence obtained would be inadmissible except for evidence
remotely and fortuitously acquired). The Ninth Circuit in Bacall, however, acknowledged that
the evidence subsequently obtained would not be admissible if the object of the illegal seizure
was the securing of the evidence which the defendant sought to suppress. Id. at 1062; see Allen
v. Cupp. 426 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1970) (voluntary confession not suppressed because of illegal arrest when purpose of illegal arrest was not to secure confession).
34. 634 F.2d at 1184; see supra note 21 and accompanying text (facts supportive of seizure
determination). 634 F.2d at 1184.
35. Id. The Allard II court observed that the agents' occupancy of the room lasted two
hours while the agents awaited a warrant. Id. at 1186.
36. See supra note 25 (AllardI court found that exigent circumstances were not present).
37. 634 F.2d at 1187; see United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir.) (court
observed that alternative to immediate entry was escalation of precautionary measures), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Hayes, 518 F.2d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 1975) (court
stated that agents could have watched door while awaiting arrival of search warrant); see also
United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976) (warrantless entry held invalid
because policce could have maintained surveillance until warrant arrived), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1064 (1977); United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1975) (police should maintain surveillance until warrant obtained unless exigent circumstances justify warrantless entry).
38. 634 F.2d at 1186-87.
39. Id. at 1187.
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a prior unlawful seizure of a home.40 The Allard 11 court's test provided that

once a defendant had demonstrated that the government illegally secured the
defendant's premises, the government must prove that the prosecution would

have both independently discovered and successfully obtained the evidence
discovered during the subsequent lawful search of the premises to permit the
admission of the illegally seized evidence." Applying the new test, the Allard
40. Id.
41. Id. To demonstrate that the agents would have both independently discovered and successfully obtained the contested evidence, the Allard I1 court suggested that the government could
have shown that the agents did not benefit from the illegal seizure of Allard's hotel room by
proving that the discovery of the contraband was inevitable and that no one would have moved
the cocaine. Id. at 1187 n.6.
Requiring the government to prove that the agents would have both independently discovered
and successfully obtained the proffered evidence appears similar to the emerging inevitable discovery
exception to the warrant requirement. The inevitable discovery doctrine permits the admission
of evidence unlawfully obtained if the government can show that the police would have inevitably
discovered the evidence lawfully notwithstanding the prior illegal seizure of the evidence. See
3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 11.4, at 620-24 (illustrations of application of inevitable discovery
doctrine); Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception in California:A Need for Clarification of
the Exclusionary Rule, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 283, 286 (1980) (discussion of inevitable discovery
doctrine). See generally LaCount & Grose, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, An Evolving Exception to the ConstitutionalExclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REv. 483, 491-511 (1976) (discussion
of application of inevitable discovery doctrine to permit admission of evidence unlawfully obtained).
Since the Allard II court's test required that the government demonstrate that the illegal seizure
did not make a difference, the Allard II test and the inevitable discovery doctrine appear identical. Compare 634 F.2d at 1187 n.7 (Allard II court's test) with 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 9,
§ 11.4 at 621 (inevitable discovery doctrine).
Although the Supreme Court had not adopted expressly the inevitable discovery doctrine,
the Court in Brewer v. Williams acknowledged that the exclusionary rule did not require the
suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence if lawful discovery of the evidence was inevitable.
430 U.S. 387, 407 n.12 (1977). In Brewer, police arrested the defendant for the abduction and
murder of a young girl whose body police had not found. Id. at 390. While transporting the
defendant to prison, police 'enticed Williams into making incriminating statements concerning
the location of the girl's body. Id. at 392-93. The trial court convicted Williams of murder and
the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed. Id. at 394. The United States Supreme Court refused to
admit the defendant's incriminating statements into evidence, holding that the police denied Williams
his right to counsel prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 404-06 (defendant entitled
to counsel during interrogation while police transported defendant to prison since issuance of
arrest warrant and arraignment had taken place). The Brewer Court, however, commented that
although the incriminating statements were inadmissible at trial, the girl's body was admissible
since the government had proven that discovery of the girl's body was inevitable. Id. at 407 n.12;
see United States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1981) (corroborating testimony of
witnesses admissible despite illegal seizure of diary since police would have obtained testimony
even without access to diary), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 464 (1982); United States ex rel. Owens
v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 1974) (work address obtained from unlawfully seized
booklet admissible since witnesses inevitably would have verified address); United States v. Seohnlein,
423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir.) (evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful search admissible because
outstanding arrest warrants issued against defendant insured that police would have arrested defendant and obtained evidence notwithstanding prior unlawful search), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913
(1970); Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790, 791-92 (2d Cir. 1943) (evidence found pursuant
to unlawful search would be admissible if police demonstrate that police would have lawfully
discovered evidence despite prior illegal seizure); see also People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 313,

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:231

I1 court determined that the government failed to demonstrate that the agents

would have both independently discovered and successfully obtained the
evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful seizure".4 The Ninth Circuit then
reversed the judgement of the district court and suppressed the evidence that

the agents seized during the search conducted pursuant to the valid search
warrant. 3
The Ninth Circuit subsequently extended the Allard1 court's test to situations in which police did not enter the premises but merely seized the premises
pending application of a search warrant." In United States v. Lomas,45 government agents arrested Robert Lomas and Peter Margolis for conspiracy to

possess cocaine with intent to distribute.4 6 An agent went to Margolis' hotel
room to secure the room until a warrant arrived. 7 After finding no one inside
the room, the agent locked the door from the outside to prevent anyone from
entering without assistance from hotel management.4" The agents subsequently
obtained a warrant and searched Margolis' hotel room uncovering evidence
380 N.E.2d 224, 231, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 402 (1978) (only high degree of probability that police
would have obtained evidence independent of illegality necessary to justify application of inevitable discovery rule), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
42. 634 F.2d at 1187.
43. Id. at 1187. In suppressing the contraband seized by the government agents, the Allard
11 court noted that the suppression of evidence subsequently obtained pursuant to the lawful
search would not be appropriate if the seized object was a vehicle. Id. at 1187 n.7. The United
States Supreme Court has permitted the warrantless seizure of transient objects upon a subjective
determination of probable cause by police. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761-62
(1979) (court upheld warrantless seizure of trunk on subjective probable cause); United Stated
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (federal agents permitted to seize footlocker on probable
cause sufficient to seize automobile until warrant obtained). The Court has justified the warrantless seizure of transient objects because of the inherent mobility of the object. See Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (seizure of suitcase from trunk of automobile due to possibility
of evidence being transported out of jurisdiction); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13
(1977) (seizure of footlocker reasonable to prevent possible removal or destruction of evidence);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (Fourth Amendment permits warrantless seizure
of automobile due to automobile's mobility). Since a home is not an inherently mobile object,
the Allard II court correctly observed that a warrantless seizure should not be permissible merely
because the police subjectively determined probable cause. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 52 (1970) (purposes underlying Fourth Amendment dictate different standards applicable to
warrantless seizures of homes).
44. See United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1983) (Allard 1Itest applies
to all efforts by law enforcement officials to maintain status quo over residence).
45. 706 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1983).
46. Id. at 889-90. In Lomas, an undercover government agent sold cocaine to Craig Para.
Id. at 889. Other government agents observed Para take a briefcase filled with money from a
white Mustang. Id. The undercover agent and Para subsequently proceeded to the First National
Bank Tower to exchange contraband for money inside a safe deposit vault. Id. Once inside the
vault, and after the exchange, the agents arrested Para. Id. Outside the bank, the agents identified Lomas and Margolis as the two occupants of the white Mustang and placed both Lomas
and Margolis under arrest. Id. at 889-90.
47. Id. at 890.
48. Id. In Lomas, the government agent used a pa6skey to enter Margolis' hotel room and
conducted a cursory security check to ensure that no one was hiding inside. Id. The Lomas court
found that the agent was inside the room less than thirty seconds and did not notice any incriminating evidence. Id.
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incriminating both Lomas and Margolis.

9

Before trial, both Lomas and

Margolis moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the hotel room.5 The
United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the defendant's
motion to suppress, reasoning that the agents' securing of the hotel room was
proper and did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.' Consequently, the
district court did not consider whether exigent circumstances were present to
justify the warrantless seizure. 2
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Lomas found that the agents' warrantless
securing of the hotel room constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and reversed the district court's decision." The Lomas court

refused to distinguish between searches and seizures of dwellings, reasoning
that unless exigent circumstances were present, both searches and seizures of

dwellings required a prior judicial magistrate's determination of probable
cause. 4 The Lomas court decided that the Allard II court's holding that a
warrantless securing of a dwelling constituted an unreasonable seizure applied
to any attempt by law enforcement officials to maintain the status quo over
a dwelling while other officials sought a search warrant. 5 The Lomas court,

therefore, did not distinguish Allard 11 on the grounds that Allard I1 involved
both a warrantless entry and seizure whereas in Lomas police did not enter
the dwelling but secured the dwelling while awaiting a search warrant.5 6 The
Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to determine whether

exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of the hotel room.

7

49. See id. (three hours elapsed between initial securing of Margolis' hotel room and arrival of search warrant).
50. Id. at 888.
51. See id. at 894.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 893.
54. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Lomas relied on United States v. Kunkler to support the court's
proposition that seizures of premises require a warrant, absent exigent circumstances. Id.; see
United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1982). In Kunkler, undercover agents entered
the defendant's home to prevent the potential destruction of evidence. Id. at 190. The agents
apprehended the defendant and secured the premises pending application for a search warrant.
Id. A search of the defendant's home pursuant to the search warrant uncovered drug paraphernalia and contraband. Id. The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
obtained pursuant to the subsequent lawful search. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that
the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment applied not only to searches but also to seizures of
the premises. Id. at 191. The Kunkler court, however, affirmed the district court's decision to
admit the evidence on the grounds that the potential destruction of evidence amounted to an
exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless seizure of the defendant's residence. Id. at 192.
But see Grano, supra note 12, at 642 (warrantless seizures of residences should be permissible
since seizures do not intrude on individual's right of privacy). See generally Dix, Means of Executing
Searches and Seizures as FourthAmendment Issues, 67 MnNs . L. Rav. 89 106-107 n.88 (1982)
(unclear why courts should regard seizures as less intrusive on the privacy rights of individuals
than searches).
55. 706 F.2d at 893-94.
56. Id. at 893-94; see Allard I, 634 F.2d at 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980) (agent unlawfully entered
and secured apartment until search warrant arrived).
57. 706 F.2d at 894. The Lomas court remanded the case to the district court not only
for a determination of whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure but also
for a determination of whether Lomas had his own Fourth Amendment rights violated by the
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The Lomas court also reaffirmed the Allard 11 court's rejection of the

independent source doctrine with respect to unlawful seizures of dwellings."
The Ninth Circuit in Lomas found that application of the independent source
doctrine to evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure of a dwelling
was impractical because of the difficulty courts have assessing whether police
possessed sufficient evidence to justify issuance of a search warrant prior to
an illegal seizure of a dwelling." The Lomas court stated that to permit the
admission of evidence seized subsequent to the unlawful seizure of a dwelling,
the government must prove that law enforcement officials would have obtained
the disputed evidence notwithstanding the illegal seizure of the dwelling. 60 The

Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
whether the government would have recovered the incriminating evidence by
means independent of the prior unlawful seizure. 6
warrantless seizure of Margolis' hotel room. Id.; see Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104
(1980) (defendant bears burden of proving not only unlawful police conduct but also legitimate
expectation of privacy in place that police illegally seized).
58. 706 F.2d at 894.
59. 706 F.2d at 894 n.4. See generally 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 9, § 11.4 at 618 (courts
have encountered difficulties ascertaining whether quantum of evidence which police possessed
at time of initial illegal conduct would establish probable cause). In Lomas, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the court's previous holding in Allard II as support for the proposition that the government must demonstrate that it would have obtained the incriminating evidence without a seizure.
Id.; see Allard 11, 634 F.2d at 1186-87 (application of independent source doctrine to warrantless
seizures is impractical); supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussion of Allard IH test).
60. 706 F.2d at 894 n.4. The Lomas court maintained that without an inevitable discovery
requirement, evidence that police seized on a subjective determination of probable cause would
be admissible, thereby vitiating the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id.; see supra
note 2 and accompanying text (Fourth Amendment warrant requirement places neutral and detached
magistrate between public and police).
61. 706 F.2d at 895. In Lomas, the Ninth Circuit held that the additional evidence incriminating Margolis which police offered into evidence rendered the district court's admission
of the illegally seized evidence harmless error. Id. at 894. The Lomas court, therefore, affirmed
Margolis' conviction. Id.
The dissent in Lomas criticized the majority's extension of the Allard 11 court's rationale
because in Lomas, the agents went to obtain a warrant prior to the warrantless seizure of the
hotel room. Id. at 896 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that in Allard II, the agents
did not decide to seek a warrant until after the warrantless entry and occupancy of the room.
Id. The dissent thus maintained that the difference in timing where police sought to obtain a
warrant prior to the unlawful seizure alleviated the Allard HI court's fears that police would secure
a dwelling without probable cause in the hope of finding a subsequent evidentiary basis to justify
a search warrant. See id. (police unlikely to search for independent evidentiary basis to justify
warrant if already in process of obtaining warrant).
Moreover, the Lomas dissent criticized the majority's adherence to the Allard H court's rejection
of the independent source doctrine with respect to unlawful seizures. Id. at 897. Noting that
several circuit courts have rejected the Allard HI court's rationale, the dissent advocated application of the independent source doctrine to permit the admission of the contested evidence despite
a prior unlawful seizure. Id.; see United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1981)
(evidence discovered through independent lawful search is admissible despite prior warrantless
entry and occupancy of dwelling), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983); United States v. Beck,
662 F.2d 527, 530 (8th Cir. 1981) (trial court should not suppress evidence obtained through
independent source notwithstanding prior illegal search or seizure); United States v. Korman,
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Concurring with the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Allard 11 and Lomas,

the majority of state courts have held that absent exigent circumstances, a
warrantless securing of a dwelling constitutes an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.62 The majority of state courts have maintained that
614 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir.) (evidence lawfully obtained admissible despite prior illegal entry
to secure premises), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); see also United States v. Annese, 631
F.2d 1041, 1042 (1st Cir. 1980) (evidence admissible since probable cause for issuance of warrant
was independent of unlawful entry). The cases that the dissent relied on, however, did not rule
on the validity of a warrantless seizure of the premises but focused solely on the warrantless
entry or search of the premises. See Segura, 663 F.2d at 416-17; Beck, 662 F.2d at 529-30; Korman,
614 F.2d at 547; see also Annese, 631 F.2d at 1042. Consequently, the circuit court decisions
cited by the Lomas dissent merely reiterate the independent source analysis used to permit the
admission of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search, but do not delve into the admissibility of evidefice obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure of a home. See Allard I, 600 F.2d
at 1304-05 (Allard I court's analysis of unlawful entry and discussion of independent source
doctrine).
Alternatively, the Lomas dissent stated that even if the test developed by the Allard 11 court
applied to the case at bar, the government had proven that the agents would have both independently
discovered and successfully obtained the proffered evidence. 706 F.2d at 897-98. The Lomas dissent noted that the hotel receipt found on Margolis pursuant to a lawful search incident to arrest
satisfied the requirement that police would have discovered the contested evidence independent
of the illegal seizure of the premises. Id. The Lomas dissent also maintained that since both
occupants of Margolis' hotel room were under arrest, the government had shown that the agents
successfully would have obtained the evidence notwithstanding the prior illegal seizure. Id. Accordingly, the Lomas dissent advocated affirmation of the convictions of both defendants since
the evidence obtained pursuant to the lawful search of Margolis' hotel room was admissible. Id.
62. See, e.g., People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 849, 533 P.2d 211, 222, 120 Cal. Rptr.
83, 94 (1975); State v. Ramos, 405 So. 2d 1001, 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Dorson,
62 Haw. 377, -,
615 P.2d 740, 744 (1980); State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 473, 572 P.2d
664 P.2d 1095, 1104 (1983).
1102, 1105 (1978); see also State v. Hansen, 295 Or. 78, -,
In Shuey, police entered and secured the defendant's residence while an officer went for
a search warrant. 13 Cal. 3d at 838-39, 533 P.2d at 214, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 86. Approximately
three hours later, officers returned with a warrant and seized contraband. Id. at 839, 533 P.2d
at 214, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The Supreme Court of California ruled that the warrantless securing
of the residence was unreasonable because the government did not demonstrate the presence of
exigent circumstances. Id. at 849, 533 P.2d at 221, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
Similarly, in Ramos, police arrested the defendant for distribution of cocaine. 405 So. 2d
at 1001. A search incident to arrest revealed contraband. Id. Believing more contraband was
inside the defendant's home, police took the defendant to his residence and entered the dwelling.
Id. Police then secured the residence while an officer went to obtain a warrant. Id. A subsequent
search pursuant to a warrant revealed more contraband. Id. at 1002. Adopting the analysis of
the Ninth Circuit in Allard 11, the Florida Court of Appeals held that the seizure of the defendant's residence was illegal. See id. at 1003 (Ramos court followed Allard 11 court's rationale
that failure to disclose illegal seizure in affidavit supporting warrant frustrated warrant requirement); see Allard 11, 634 F.2d at 1187 (failure to mention illegal seizure on affidavit supporting
warrant debases Fourth Amendment function of magistrates). The Florida Court reasoned that
permitting police to secure dwellings without a warrant would encourage police to disregard the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement until the unlawful seizure produced indications that
a subsequent lawful search would reveal contraband. Id. at 1003. Accordingly, the court suppressed the contraband although the police did not discover or seize the contraband until a search
warrant arrived. Id.
In Dorson, police entered the defendant's home to secure the premises to prevent the poten615 P.2d at 743. After a search warrant arrived,
tial destruction of evidence. 62 Haw. at -,
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a seizure of a home amounts to a seizure of all articles contained within the
home.6 3 The majority, therefore, have reasoned that a subsequent seizure of
evidence during a lawful search could not retroactively validate a prior unlawful
seizure of a home and the home's contents. 64 Consequently, the majority of
state courts have decided that the evidence subsequently seized pursuant to
of the prior unlawful seizure
a lawful search was inadmissible at trial6 because
5
of the home and the home's contents.

Although the majority of state courts have agreed with the reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit in Allard II and Lomas, the New York Court of Appeals
held in People v. Arnau66 that a warrantless securing of a dwelling did not
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 67 In Arnau,
police arrested the defendant in the first floor foyer of the defendant's apartment building for distribution of cocaine.' The police led the defendant to
the defendant's apartment and entered the apartment without the defendant's
consent. 69 The police then conducted a brief security check of the apartment
615 P.2d at 743. The
the police searched the premises and uncovered contraband. Id. at -,
trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, reasoning that although the police conduct
constituted an impounding, the impounding did not amount to a search or seizure of items inside
the dwelling. Id. at -,
615 P.2d at 744. The Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed the decision
of the trial court and stated that an impounding of a home constitutes an impoundment of the
, 615 P.2d at 744. The court further acknowledged that the securing
home's contents. Id. at 615 P.2d at 744.
of the home curtailed the freedom of movement of the occupants. Id. at -,
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the police's conduct amounted to a seizure of the
615 P.2d at 744. Since
home and the home's contents under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at -,
the government failed to demonstrate that the delay in obtaining a warrant would have resulted
in the destruction of evidence, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that exigent circumstances did
615 P.2d at 746.
not justify the warrantless seizure. Id. at -,
In Bean, police went to obtain a warrant prior to securing the home of the defendant. 89
Wash. 2d at 470, 572 P.2d at 1103. Prior to the arrival of the warrant, however, police officers
entered and secured the residence until a search warrant arrived. Id. The officers subsequently
seized contraband in the search of Bean's home. Id. at 470, 572 P.2d at 1104. The Washington
Supreme Court determined that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry and
occupancy of Bean's home. Id. at 473, 572 P.2d at 1105. Consequently, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the warrantless securing of the defendant's home constituted an unreasonable
seizure and suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to the lawful search. Id.
63. See People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 850, 533 P.2d 211, 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 94
(1975) (warrantless securing of home similar to situation where police seized particular items which
defendant sought to suppress prior to issuance of search warrant); State v. Dorson, 62 Haw.
377, -,
615 P.2d 740, 744 (1980) (impoundment of dwelling constitutes seizure of home and
home's contents). But see People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27, 34-35, 444 N.E.2d 13, 17, 457 N.Y.S.2d
763, 767 (1982) (seizure of dwelling does not automatically constitute seizure of dwelling's contents).
64. See supra note 62 (state courts' analysis of situations involving evidence lawfully obtained following a prior unlawful seizure of a home).
65. Id.

66. 58 N.Y.2d 27, 444 N.E.2d 13, 457 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1982).
67. Id. at 36-37, 444 N.E.2d at 18-19, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69.
68. Id. at 30, 444 N.E.2d at 14, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 764. In Arnau, an undercover police
officer purchased cocaine from the defendant. Id. at 29, 444 N.E.2d at 14, 457 N.Y.S.2d at
764. The undercover police officer informed a narcotics squad surveillance team that cocaine
was inside the defendant's apartment. Id. at 30, 444 N.E.2d at 14, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 764. The
narcotics squad decided to enter and secure the premises immediately. Id.
69. d.. 444 N.E.2d at 14-15, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 764-65.
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and called for assistance to secure the apartment pending application for a
search warrant.7 A subsequent search of the defendant's apartment pursuant
to a search warrant revealed contraband." At trial, the defendant moved to
suppress the evidence obtained during the search pursuant to the warrant.7"
The Appellate Division granted the defendant's motion to suppress, reasoning
that absent the presence of exigent circumstances, the police unlawfully entered
and secured the defendant's apartment. " Accordingly, the Appellate Division
decided that the unlawful securing of the defendant's apartment mandated
application of the exclusionary
rule to suppress evidence subsequently obtained
74
during the lawful search.
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision that the police's warrantless securing of Arnau's apartment
constituted an unreasonable seizure of the apartment and the contents of
the apartment. 75 The Arnau court reasoned that a seizure of an apartment
did not constitute a seizure of all items contained within the apartment, but
only a seizure of items which police discovered during the initial unlawful
entry and seizure of the apartment. 76 The Arnau court maintained that evidence
contained within the apartment which police did not discover until the subsequent search pursuant to a valid warrant did not result from exploitation of
the prior illegal entry and seizure of the apartment. 77 The New York Court
of Appeals concluded that the police, by securing the apartment pending application for a search warrant, did not seize any evidence which the police
7
did not discover until the subsequent search pursuant to a valid warrant.
The Arnau court also rejected the Allard II court's interpretation of the
exclusionary rule with respect to evidence seized pursuant to a lawful search
following a prior warrantless seizure of a defendant's dwelling. 9 The court
stated that where contested evidence was the product of an independent source,
a court should admit the evidence since the exclusionary rule does not apply
70. Id., 444 N.E.2d at 15, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 765. TheArnau court found that police checked

the apartment for occupants and possible exits or entrances but did not conduct a search of
the defendant's apartment. Id. The Arnau court further determined that police did not discover

or seize evidence during the initial entry into Arnau's apartment. Id.
71. Id. at 30-31, 444 N.E.2d at 15, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
72. See id. at 31, 444 N.E.2d at 15, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 765. (trial court denied Arnau's motion
to suppress evidence discovered during lawful search of apartment).
73. 85 A.D.2d 607, 608, 444 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684 (1981). In reversing the district court's

decision to admit the evidence seized from Arnau's apartment, the Appellate Division in Arnau
stated that the mere fact that contraband can be easily disposed of does not constitute an exigent
circumstance justifying a warrantless seizure. Id. The Appellate Division observed that although
probable cause existed to arrest the defendant, the objective of police in entering and securing
the dwelling was to secure the apartment without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances. Id.
74. Id.
75. 58 N.Y.2d at 34-35, 444 N.E.2d at 17, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
76. See id. (unlawful act of securing apartment did not amount to seizure of contraband
because police did not discover contraband during initial entry).

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (Arnau court rejected Allard II test
and applied traditional independent source doctrine to permit admission of evidence).
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to situations in which no causal connection exists between an initial unlawful
seizure of a dwelling and a subsequent lawful seizure of the evidence. 0
Reasoning that the police did not obtain the evidence through exploitation
of the prior seizure of Arnau's apartment, the Arnau court determined that

the suppression of evidence lawfully seized would not further the exclusionary
rule's goal of deterrence of unlawful police conduct.8 Consequently, the Arnau
court held that the evidence subsequently seized from Arnau's apartment was
admissible. 2
As support for the holding that a warrantless securing of a dwelling con-

stitutes a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Arnau court
relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mincey v. Arizona. 3
In Mincey, police executed a narcotics raid of Mincey's apartment." During

the raid, a shootout ensued and one of the occupants of the apartment killed
a police officer.8" After restoring order, police awaited the arrival of homicide
detectives who proceeded to conduct an exhaustive search of the apartment
over the course of several days.

6

The search resulted in the seizure of

80. 58 N.Y.2d at 35, 444 N.E.2d at 17, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (courts should apply independent source doctrine to evidence which is not product of prior illegality); see United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980) (witnesses' in-court identification of defendant not derived from
prior illegal arrest where witness knew victim's identity prior to unlawful arrest); see also 3 W.
LAFAvE, supranote 9, § 11.4, at 617 (soundness of independent source doctrine is beyond question). See generally note 10 and accompanying text (discussion of independent source doctrine).
81. See 58 N.Y.2d at 37, 444 N.E.2d at 19, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (exclusionary rule not
intended to exclude evidence seized pursuant to valid warrant which did not contain illegally
obtained information); supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussion of purposes underlying
exclusionary rule).
82. 58 N.Y.2d at 37, 444 N.E.2d at 19, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 769. The dissent in Arnau stated
that an illegal seizure occurred when police secured the dwelling prior to obtaining a warrant.
Id. at 40, 444 N.E.2d at 21, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 771 (Jones, J., dissenting). The dissent observed
that the Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to dominion and control over
their premises and a trespass occurs when police deny an individual access to and possession
of his property. Id. at 39, 444 N.E.2d at 20, 457 N.Y.S. at 770; see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 76 (1906) (seizure constitutes forcible dispossession of owner). The dissent maintained that
the independent source doctrine applies only to situations where the police have two avenues
of access to obtain the evidence seized, one legal and the other illegal. 58 N.Y.2d at 41, 444
N.E.2d at 21, 457 N.Y.S. at 771. The dissent asserted, however, that the independent source
doctrine did not apply to admit evidence seized in violation of Arnau's constitutional rights because
police subsequently obtained a search warrant under which the police lawfully could have seized
the evidence. Id.
83. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
84. Id. at 387. In Mincey, an undercover officer who had arranged to purchase narcotics
from the defendant entered Mincey's apartment. Id. Other officers heard the undercover officer
shout "police" as the officer entered. See State v. Mincey 115 Ariz. 472, -,
566 P.2d 273,
283 (1977).
85. 437 U.S. at 387.
86. Id. at 388-89. In Mincey, a Tucson Police Department directive mandated that police
officers should not investigate incidents which the officers personally participated in. Id. at 388.
Consequently, the officers on the scene guarded the suspects and the premises while awaiting
the homicide detectives, Id. When the detectives arrived, the detectives conducted a four day
search of the apartment and seized between 200 and 300 items. Id. at 389.
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contraband. 7 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence reasoning that
the police unlawfully seized the contraband from his apartment. 8 Affirming
the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, the Supreme
Court of Arizona held that, when police were legally on the premises,8 9 a
"murder scene" exception to the warrant requirement permitted police to conduct a warrantless search of the scene of a homicide without violating the
Fourth Amendment." The United States Supreme Court, however, repudiated
the Arizona Supreme Court's "murder scene" exception to the warrant
requirement. 9' The Mincey court reasoned that exigent circumstances did not
exist to justify the warrantless search of Mincey's apartment since the record
did not indicate that the delay in obtaining a warrant to search the premises
would have resulted in the destruction or removal of evidence. 9 2 The Supreme
Court in Mincey observed, however, that the presence of a police guard on
93
the premises minimized the potential destruction or removal of evidence.
Tracking the language of the Supreme Court in Mincey, the Arnau court
found the Supreme Court's approval of utilizing police to maintain the status
quo over a dwelling prior to the issuance of a search warrant without violating
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. 9 The
Arnau court, however, misplaced reliance on Mincey as supportive of the
court's position that a warrantless securing of a dwelling constitutes a
reasonable seizure.9" In Mincey, some evidence contained within the apart-

87. Id. at 389.
88. Id.
89. See ARiz. Ray. STAT. AN. § 13-3891 (1978) (previously codified at id. § 13-1411 (1956))
(officer may break open door of any building in which felon who officer seeks to arrest without
warrant is, or officer believes to be, provided that felon has refused officer admittance after
officer announced his authority and purpose); supra note 84 (officer announced authority and
purpose when door opened). Although the entry and arrest was pursuant to statute and lawful
when the Arizona Supreme Court decided Mincey, the Supreme Court subsequently prohibited
police from making warrantless entries into a suspect's home to make a felony arrest. See Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (warrantless entry into home to make arrest prohibited
by Fourth Amendment unless exigent circumstances present).
90. 115 Ariz. 472, -,
566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977) (warrantless search permissible under
"murder scene" exception where police restricted search to evidence relevant to intent or establishing
circumstances of officer's death).
91. 437 U.S. at 390. The Mincey Court refused to classify the Arizona "murder scene"
exception under one of the pre-existing exceptions to the warrant requirement because a four
day search would not fall within the exigent circumstances exception which permits an emergency
search. Id. at 393; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussion of exigent circumstance
exception to warrant requirement).
92. Id. at 393. In refusing to hold that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search,
the Mincey court acknowledged that police had located all persons within the apartment prior
to the detective's arrival. Id. The Mincey court, therefore, stated that police could not justify
an exhaustive four day search by the exigencies of the situation present. Id.
93. Id. at 394.
94. 58 N.Y.2d at 34-36, 444 N.E.2d at 18-19, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69.
95. Id.; see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussion of Arnau court's misplaced
reliance on Mincey).
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ment, such as blood on the floor, required immediate examination." Moreover,
an Arizona statute granted police the authority to enter a dwelling to make
7
a lawful arrest if police believed a felon was inhabiting the dwelling. Since
the police in Mincey were lawfully present on the premises to conduct a lawful
arrest, 99 the exigency of the possible loss of evidence due to delay would have
permitted a brief warrantless search of the premises. 9 9 Generally, courts have
held that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of a dwelling
also would justify a warrantless seizure of a dwelling.'9 9 Consequently, the
exigency of the possible loss of evidence would have justified a brief warrantless seizure until a warrant arrived." ' The Arnau court, therefore, incorrectly characterized the warrantless securing of a dwelling, absent exigent circumstances, as reasonable under Mincey since the police were lawfully present

on the premises and the potential loss of evidence constituted an exigent cir0"
cumstance justifying a brief warrantless seizure of the premises.
A warrantless seizure of a dwelling until police obtain a search warrant
9
arguably is permissible whenever police have probable cause to seize.' " One
possible justification for allowing seizures on the police's subjective determination of probable cause is that seizures only interfere with the victim's possessory
interest in the item seized and do not constitute a grave intrusion upon the
victim's privacy interests." ' Police, therefore, can rectify a wrongful seizure
96. See 437 U.S. at 406 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Arizona
court should consider on remand whether blood on floor required immediate examination).
97. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3891 (1978) (previously codified at id. § 13-1411 (1956))
(Arizona statute permits warrantless entry to make felony arrest).
98. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (officer justified in entering apartment pursuant
to Arizona statute).
99. 437 U.S. at 406 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Mincey, Justice
Rehnquist, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, stated that the Arizona courts should consider on remand what evidence police would have lost if police did not conduct an immediate
examination. Id.; see supra note 96 (blood on floor necessitated immediate examination). By
advocating that the Arizona courts consider what evidence required an immediate examination,
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that evidence which required immediate attention would have
justified a warrantless search. 437 U.S. at 406.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1982) (imminent
destruction of evidence permits warrantless seizure of premises); Allard II, 634 F.2d at 1187 (police
may secure premises if exigent circumstances such as potential destruction of evidence exist);
United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 226-27 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978) (exigent circumstances justified
entry and securing without warrant); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussion
of exigent circumstances exception to warrant requirement).
101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (warrantless seizures permitted if exigent
circumstances are present).
102. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (Arnau court incorrectly interpreted
Mincey); see also Brief of Petitioners at 41-42, United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (Feb. 22, 1983) (Mincey court might have permitted limited
impoundment of apartment because police were lawfully on premises and could have obtained
warrant while awaiting arrival of homicide detectives).
103. See Grano, supra note 12, at 647 (seizures do not require warrant because seizures are
less intrusive than searches).
104. Id. at 648. Other than justifying warrantless seizures of a home on the basis that seizures
do not invade the privacy interests of the victim, Grano offers two additional justifications for
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merely by return of the seized item. ,05 In contrast, an unlawful search represents

an irrevocable intrusion upon the victim's privacy interests.'0 6 Although a warrantless seizure of a dwelling does not represent as great an intrusion upon
the privacy rights of the individual as a warrantless search,' 7 the seizure,
nonetheless, constitutes a significant invasion into the privacy interests of the
owner0 o and innocent third parties who are on the premises.' 9 With reference
to other constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has forbidden one means

of obtaining a societal goal in favor of a less intrusive alternative which achieves
the same societal goal."10 The Ninth Circuit in Allard I and Lomas, therefore,
was correct in denouncing warrantless seizures of dwellings on the police's
subjective determination of probable cause because normal police procedures
reveal a less intrusive alternative, such as surveillance, which guards against
the potential destruction or removal of evidence."'
The Supreme Court has not delineated an exception to the warrant requirement that would, absent exigent circumstances, permit a warrantless

seizure of a home."I2 One commentator has suggested that impounding a home

permitting the warrantless seizure of a dwelling. Id. at 647-48. First, Grano contends that the
constitutional framers did not intend for warrantless seizures, when apart from searches, to be
violative of the Constitution. Id. at 648. Second, the warrant clause requirement that the warrant
specifically describe the place which police intend to search has no relevance when a seizure occurs
distinct from a search. Id.
105. Id.; see also United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1975) (seizures do not
invade privacy interests but instead constitute taking of property), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1078 (1976).
106. See Grano, supra note 12, at 648 (damages may recompense but can not restore invasion of privacy interests).
107. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1977) (search of interior of footlocker
much greater intrusion than impoundment); supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (Grano
discussion of warrantless seizures constituting lesser intrusion than searches). But see Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (highly debatable question whether seizure of automobile
amounts to lesser intrusion than search).
108. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (seizure
of personal property amounts to significant intrusion of owner's privacy interests); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 n.8 (1977) (impoundment of footlocker amounted to substantial
infringement of owner's use and possession); Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d at 39, 444 N.E.2d at 20, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 770, (Jones J., dissenting) (unreasonable seizure of home excludes owner from use
and possession constituting trespass on owner's Fourth Amendment rights).
109. See Note, Police Practicesand the ThreatenedDestruction of Tangible Evidence, 84
-ALv. L. REv. 1465, 1475 (1971) (police should not have authority to restrict person's freedom
of movement merely because evidence of crime may be present) [hereinafter cited as PolicePractices].
110. See Police Practices,supra note 109, at 1476 (Supreme Court consistantly has adopted
least intrusive method of obtaining societal goals); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
51 (1970) (only lesser intrusion permissible until magistrate authorizes greater intrusion). See generally
Warmuth & Minkin, The Doctrine of the ReasonableAIternative,9 UTAH L. Rnv. 254, 306 (1964)
(doctrine of reasonable alternative requires acceptance of least intrusive alternative which obtains
same ends as more intrusive measure).
111. See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (warrantless seizures are impermissible
under Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances); see also United States v. Calhoun, 542
F.2d 1084, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976) (surveillance is viable alternative to exigent seizure).
112. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (Supreme Court has not sanctioned warrantless
seizure of dwelling while awaiting search warrant).
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is appropriate if police have probable cause to search at the time police initiate the seizure and have reasonable cause to believe that the destruction
of evidence inside the dwelling is imminent."13 The commentator recognizing
such an exception to the warrant requirement, however, premised permitting
the warrantless seizure of a dwelling on the presence of exigent circumstances.1 4 If the police have reasonable cause to believe that the destruction of evidence contained within a dwelling is imminent, then the majority
of courts have found that exigent circumstances exist to justify a seizure of
a home without a warrant.' Because the commentator advocated the impounding of a home under circumstances which are subsumed by the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the commentator,
therefore, would not support the Arnau court's approval of a warrantless
seizure of a dwelling absent the presence of exigent circumstances." 6
Permitting a warrantless seizure of a home based on probable cause would
alleviate the Allard 11court's fears that police might seize a dwelling and then
seek an independent evidentiary basis to justify issuance of a warrant because
police already would possess a sufficient probable cause to justify issuance
of a search warrant.' Allowing police to secure a home without a warrant,
however, authorizes police subjectively to determine the existence of probable
cause, obviating the Fourth Amendment's mandate that a neutral and detached
magistrate make the probable cause determination."' Even if police are in
the process of obtaining a warrant prior to securing a dwelling, the police,
nonetheless, still would seize the dwelling on a subjective determination of
probable cause.' Since the Supreme Court has drawn only a few well
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, 2 courts should follow the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Allard H and Lomas that a warrantless securing
constitutes an unreasonable seizure
of a dwelling, absent exigent circumstances,
2
under the Fourth Amendment.' '
Once a court had established that a warrantless seizure of a home would
113. See Police Practices, supra note 109, at 1480-81 (discussion of limits placed on warrantless impoundings of homes).
114. Id.
115. See supra note 100 (cases involving warrantless seizures of homes due to exigent
circumstances).
116. See Police Practices,supra note 109, at 1481 (warrantless seizures only permissible if
evidence threatened with destruction which constitutes exigent circumstance); see also 2 W. LAFAv,
supra note 9, § 65, at 450 (impounding of home is alternative to exigent entry).
117. See United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1983) (Lomas dissent
distinguished Allard II from Lomas on basis that police sought warrant in Lomas prior to illegal
seizure; see also note 61 (discussion of Lomas dissent).
118. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (warrant requirement provides that impartial
judicial magistrate should make probable cause determination).
119. See Lomas, 706 F.2d at 894 n.4 (adoption of Lomas dissent's distinction in timing
as to when police attempt to obtain search warrant does not alleviate problem of police subjectively determining probable cause).
120. See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text (consent and presence of exigent circumstances
are only exceptions to warrant requirement for search or seizure of home).
121. See supratext accompanying notes 112-120 (analysis of warrantless seizures of homes).
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violate the Fourth Amendment unless exigent circumstances were present, the
second question involves the admissibility of evidence lawfully seized from a
dwelling following a prior unlawful seizure of the dwelling.' 22 The Allard II
test required the government to demonstrate that the police would have both
independently discovered and successfully obtained the disputed evidence in
order to permit admission at trial.' 23 Since the Allard II court restricted application of the court's test to unlawful seizures,' 24 the Allard 11 court did
not reject application of the independent source doctrine with respect to
unlawful searches.' 2' Application of the independent source doctrine to
unlawful searches ensures that police obtain probable cause to justify issuance
of a subsequent search warrant from means independent of the prior illegal
search. 26 The police, however, do not obtain probable cause from an unlawful
seizure of a home since the unlawful seizure constitutes an attempt by police
to maintain the status quo pending application for a search warrant.I27 Courts,
therefore, should not apply the independent source doctrine to evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure of a home.' 28
To ensure that police do not profit from an unlawful seizure of a home,' 29
courts should not admit evidence obtained from a subsequent lawful seizure
unless the government can show that discovery of the evidence was inevitable
notwithstanding the prior unlawful seizure. 3 Requiring the government to
demonstrate that the prior unlawful seizure did not make a difference
guarantees that police do not benefit from unreasonable conduct.'' Accordingly, the Allard II test requires the government to demonstrate that a prior
unlawful seizure did not make a difference because the government must prove
that the police inevitably would have obtained the evidence despite the prior
illegal seizure. 32 Application of the Allard 11 test, therefore, furthers the ex122. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (courts which have refused to apply independent source doctrine to illegally seized evidence); Lomas, 706 F.2d at 893 (court considered when
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant is admissible despite prior unlawful seizure).
123. See Allard II, 634 F.2d at 1187; supra note 41 and acccompanying text (similarity between Allard II court's test for determining admissibility of unlawfully seized evidence and inevitable discovery doctrine).
124. See Allard I, 634 F.2d at 1182 (application of Allard II test contingent on defendant
demonstrating that government illegally secured evidence).
125. See id.
126. See supra notes 9, 10 and accompanying text (evidence lawfully obtained not admissible
if affidavit supporting warrant contains information gathered from prior illegal conduct).
127. See United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1983) (agents secured hotel
room to prevent destruction or removal of evidence).
128. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text (application of independent source
doctrine).
129. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (primary goal of exclusionary rule is deterrence of unlawful police conduct).
130. See supra notes 127, 129 and accompanying text (requiring police to show that discovery
of evidence was inevitable prohibits police from benefitting from unlawfully maintaining status
quo over dwelling).
131. Id.
132. See Allard II, 634 F.2d at 1187 n.6 (9th Cir. 1980) (government must prove seizure
made no practical difference in order to permit admission of illegally seized evidence); see also
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clusionary rule's goal of deterrence of unlawful police conduct since evidence
which police obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure of a home is inadmissible
at trial.' 33 Consequently, courts should apply the Allard 11 test to unlawful

seizures since the Allard II test furthers the goals of the exclusionary rule with
respect to unreasonable seizures as 34the independent source doctrine does with
respect to unreasonable searches.

The Fourth Amendment does not distinguish between searches and seizures
of a home.' 3' Accordingly, both searches and seizures of a home should re-

quire a warrant unless exigent circumstances are present.'

36

Absent exigent

circumstances, warrantless seizures of homes are unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.' 37 Since the warrantless securing of a home is an attempt to maintain the status quo over the owner's premises until a warrant arrives, the warrantless securing of a home constitutes a seizure of the home and the home's
contents. 3 By requiring the government to show that the discovery of the
evidence was inevitable, the Allard 11 test ensures that police do not profit
from an illegal seizure of a home, thereby furthering the purposes of the exclusionary rule.' 39 Consequently, courts should concur with the Allard II and
Lomas rationale that a warrantless securing of a dwelling constitutes an
unreasonable seizure and should adopt the Allard II test for permitting the
4
admission of evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful seizure of a home.' 1
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United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1982) (evidence obtained because of prior illegal
seizure of defendant held admissible because logical course of investigation would have led police
to evidence).
133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (exclusion of illegally seized evidence guarantees
police do not profit from unlawful conduct).
134. Id.
135. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (Fourth Amendment prohibits both unreasonable searches
and seizures).
136. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (both searches and seizures require search
warrant); see also United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1981) (no Fourth Amendment distinction between searches and seizures).
137. See supra notes 32-37 and 53-57 and accompanying text (warrantless seizures of home
impermissible under Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances).
138. See supra notes 33, 62, 127 and accompanying text (securing of dwelling constitutes
seizure of dwelling and contents).
139. See supra notes 7, 41 and accompanying text (illegally seized evidence requires suppression unless government can show seizure did not make practical difference).
140. See supra notes 38-43 and 58-61 and accompanying text (AllardII and Lomas courts
properly rejected application of independent source doctrine for warrantless seizures).

